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Abstract 
 
Mobile devices are increasingly utilized to access social media and instant messaging services, 
which allow users to communicate with others easily and quickly. However, the misuse of social 
media and instant messaging services facilitated conducting different cybercrimes such as cyber 
stalking, cyber bullying, slander spreading and sexual harassment. Therefore, mobile devices are 
an important evidentiary piece in digital investigation. In this chapter, we report the results of our 
investigation and analysis of social media and instant messaging services in Firefox OS. We 
examined three social media services (Facebook, Twitter and Google+) as well as  three instant 
messaging services (Telegram, OpenWapp and Line). Our analysis may pave the way for future 
forensic investigators to trace and examine residual remnants of forensics value in FireFox OS. 
 
Keywords: Firefox OS forensics; mobile forensics; social media forensics; instant messaging 
forensics; mobile applications investigation
  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The exponential growth of social media and instant messaging applications facilitated 
development of many serious cybercrime and malicious activities (Mohtasebi and 
Dehghantanha, 2011a). Cybercriminals are constantly changing their strategies to target rapidly 
growing social media and instant messaging users. The misuse of social media and instant 
messaging in mobile devices may allow cybercriminals to utilize these services for malicious 
purposes (Mohtasebi and Dehghantanha, 2011b) such as spreading malicious codes, obtaining 
and disseminating confidential information etc. Many social media and instant messaging 
providers have extended their services to mobile platforms (Dezfouli et al., 2015) which worsen 
the situation as users are in danger of losing even more private information (Taylor et al., 2012). 
Copyright infringement, cyber stalking, cyber bullying, slander spreading and sexual harassment 
are becoming serious threats to social media and instant messaging mobile users (Dezfouli et al., 
2013). Therefore, it is common to confront with different types of mobile devices during variety 
of forensics investigation cases (Damshenas et al., 2014). Mobile devices are now an important 
source of forensic remnants relevant to users social media and instant messaging activities 
(Mohtasebi and Dehghantanha, 2013). However, difference between mobile devices mandate 
forensics investigators to develop customized methods and techniques for investigation of 
different phones (Mohtasebi et al., 2012).  
 
With the emergence of smartphones, almost all parts of phones such as internal storage, 
flash memory and internal volatile memory contains valuable evidences (Yang et al., 2016). 
Chen extracted SMS, phone book, call recording, scheduling, and documents from Windows 
Mobile OS via Bluetooth, Infrared and USB using Microsoft ActiveSync (Chen et al., 2009). The 
acquired data were extracted from mobile phone internal storage, SIM card as well as removable 
memory. Irwin and Hunt have successfully mapped internal and external memory of Windows 
Mobile ver.5 running on IPAQ Pocket PC over wireless connections using their own developed 
forensic tools (Irwin and Hunt, 2009). Pooters has developed a forensic tool called Symbian 
Memory Imaging Tool (SMIT) to create bit-by-bit copies of the internal flash memory of 
Symbian OS phones such as Nokia E65, E70 and N78 model (Pooters, 2010). Lessard and 
Kessler (Lessard and Kessler, 2010) have acquired a bit-by-bit logical image of a HTC Hero 
memory using UNIX dd command and analyzed the resulted images using AccessData Forensic 
Toolkit (FTK) Imager v2.5.1 (Accessdata, 2007). Gómez-Miralles and Arnedo-Moreno have 
XWLOL]HGD -DLOEURNHQ L3DG¶V FDPHUD FRQQHFWLRQNLW WR DFTXLUH DQ LPDJHRI WKHGHYLFHYLD86%
connection (Gómez-Miralles and Arnedo-Moreno, 2012). Iqbal has enhanced Gómez-Miralles 
and Arnedo-Moreno method by developing a method to acquire iOS memory images without 
jail-breaking the device (Iqbal et al., 2012). Sylve has presented a methodology and toolset for 
acquisition volatile physical memory of Android devices by creating a new kernel module for 
dumping the memory (Sylve et al., 2012). 
 
Beyond evidence acquisition, many researchers have shown big interest in investigating 
social media and instant messaging services on different mobile platforms. Husain and Sridhar 
have analyzed AIM, Yahoo! Messenger and Google Talk instant messaging applications in 
Apple iOS to detect potential application of these instant messaging services, particularly in 
 cyber bullying and cyber stalking (Husain and Sridhar, 2010). They have managed to detect 
username, password, buddy list, last login time and conversation contents together with 
timestamp. Jung has analyzed eight social media applications in Apple iOS namely Cyworld, 
Me2Day, Daum Yozm, Twitter, Facebook, NateOn UC., KakaoTalk and MyPeople (Jung et al., 
2011) and managed to retrive user info, friend list, message, contact and media informtion of 
each application. Tso has observed the diversification of the backup files for Facebook, 
WhatsApp Messenger, Skype, Windows Live Messenger and Viber in Apple iOS (Tso et al., 
2012). Anglano has analyzed WhatsApp Messenger application remnants on an Android 
smartphone and reconstructed the list of contacts and the chronology of communicated messages 
(Anglano, 2014). Karpisek has successfully decrypted the network traffic of WhatsApp 
Messenger and managed t obtain forensic artifact related to call features and visualized messages 
that have been exchanged between users (Karpisek et al., 2015). Walnycky has examined 20 
popular instant messaging applications on Android platform and has reconstructed some or the 
entire message content of 16 applications (Walnycky et al., 2015). Said has conducted a 
comparative study of Facebook and Twitter remnants on Apple iOS, Windows Mobile and RIM 
BlackBerry (Said et al., 2011) and extracted Facebook and Twitter remnants of Apple iOS, and 
Facebook. Mutawa has compared evidences of Facebook, Twitter and MySpace in three different 
operating systems namely Apple iOS, Google Android and RIM BlackBerry and could not 
recover any artifact from Blackberry while iPhones and Android contained many valuable 
artefacts (Al Mutawa et al., 2012). Iqbal (Iqbal et al., 2014) has FRPSDUHGDUWLIDFWVRI6DPVXQJ¶V
ChatON application between a Samsung Galaxy Note running Android 4.1 and an Apple iPhone 
running with iOS 6  and managed to detect all sent and received messages with timestamp and 
location of the sent files on both platforms. Dezfouli investigated Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn 
and Google+ on Android and Apple iOS platforms and managed to recover many artifacts 
including username, contact information, location, friend list, social media post, messages, 
comments and IP addresses of selected social media applications on both platforms (Dezfouli et 
al., 2015). Table 1 is summarizing the literature on social media and instant messaging 
investigation forensics.  
 
Table 1 - Summary of Social Media and Instant Messaging Investigation on  
Multiple Mobile Platforms 
 
Researcher(s) Application(s) Platform(s) 
Husain and Sridhar 2010 AIM, Yahoo! Messenger, 
Google Talk 
Apple iOS 
Jung et al. 2011 Cyworld, Me2Day, Daum 
Yozm, Twitter, Facebook, 
NateOn UC., KakaoTalk, 
MyPeople 
Apple iOS 
Tso et al. 2012 Facebook, WhatsApp 
Messenger, Skype, Windows 
Live Messenger, Viber 
Apple iOS 
Anglano 2014 WhatsApp Messenger Google Android 
Karpisek et al. 2015  WhatsApp Messenger Google Android  
Walnycky et al. 2016 WhatsApp Messenger, Viber, 
Instagram, Okcupid, ooVoo, 
Google Android 
 Tango, Kik, Nimbuzz, eetMe, 
MessageMe, TextMe, Grindr, 
HeyWire, Hike, textPlus, 
Facebook Messenger, Tinder, 
Wickr, Snapchat, Blackberry 
Messenger 
Said et al. 2011 Facebook, Twitter Apple iOS, Windows Mobile, 
RIM BlackBerry 
Al Mutawa et al. 2012 Facebook, Twitter, MySpace Apple iOS, Google Android, 
RIM Blackberry 
Iqbal et al. 2014 6DPVXQJ¶V&KDW21 Apple iOS, Google Android 
Dezfouli et al. 2015 Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, 
Google+  
Apple iOS, Google Android 
 
As can be seen from Table 1, there was no previous work investigating remnants of 
Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Telegram, OpenWapp and Line applications on Firefox OS (FxOS) 
which is the gap targeted in this paper. In this chapter, we present investigation of a Geeksphone, 
model name Peak (Geeksphone, 2013) running FxOS 1.1.1 as the main subject of the 
investigation. Two binary images were taken from the phone internal storage and internal 
memory and then valuable forensics remnants were examined. We have mainly interested in 
evidential remnants of user activities with Facebook, Twitter, Google+, Telegram, OpenWapp 
and Line applications.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, we will explain the 
methodology used in our research and in section 3, we will outline the setup for our experiment. 
In section 4, we will present our research findings and conclude our research in section 5. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
This research has performed an investigation on Mozilla FxOS running on a phone 
released by Geeksphone, called Peak (Geeksphone, 2013). Released in April 2013, this phone is 
equipped with FxOS version 1.1.1. Table 2 shows the full specification of Geeksphone Peak. 
 
Table 2 - Geeksphone Peak Full Specification 
 
Hardware Detail 
Processor 1.2 GHz Qualcomm Snapdragon S4 8225 
processor (ARMv7) 
Memory 512 MB Ram 
Storage -Internal 4GB 
-Micro SD up to 16GB 
Battery - 1800 mAh 
- micro-USB charging 
Data Inputs Capacitive multi-touch IPS display 
Display 540 × 960 px (qHD) capacitive touchscreen, 4.3" 
Sensor -Ambient light sensor 
-Proximity sensor 
-Accelerometer 
Camera 8 MP (Rear), 2 MP (Front) 
 Connectivity -WLAN IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n 
-Bluetooth 2.1 +EDR 
-micro-USB 2.0 
-GPS 
-mini-SIM card 
-FM receiver 
Compatible Network - GSM 850 / 900 / 1800 / 1900 
- HSPA (Tri-band) 
- HSPA/UMTS 850 / 1900 / 2100 
Dimension -Width: 133.6 millimetres (5.26 in) 
-Height: 66 millimetres (2.6 in) 
-Thickness: 8.9 millimetres (0.35 in) 
 
As illustrated in the Figure 1, initially the device setting were wiped and restored to the 
default factory setting. The acquisition process was then executed to acquire FxOS phone image 
(.ffp) and memory image (.ffm). The first two binary images were then marked as base image 
and their MD5 hash values were preserved. Next, the investigator installed social media or 
instant messaging applications to the phone via Mozilla Market Place. The investigator simulate 
the actual use of the application by running communication activities such as posting, sending 
private message, received reply, upload picture, mentioning, following, and many more social 
media and instant messaging activities. Each of detail steps, credentials and communication 
activities were documented properly in forensically sound manner. Finally, second acquisition 
process performed to identify and investigate what artifact are likely to remain, what type of 
credential can be extracted, and what data remnants could be recovered. Both images were 
named according to the type of application installed and its MD5 hash values were taken. This 
step meant for comparison to the earlier data acquisition, to see if there were any differences 
with the other MD5 hash values.  
 
 
  
Figure 1 - Method to Create Forensic Evidences 
 
Our method to create forensic evidences in Figure 1 were performed by using Facebook, 
Twitter, Telegram, OpenWapp and Line applications. We also repeat this method using 
Facebook, Twitter, Google+ and Telegram mobile web, in order to compare both FxOS 
applications artifacts and mobile web activities artifacts. However, comparison was not possible 
for OpenWapp and Line application artifacts, since both applications were not offered in mobile 
web platforms. It is vital to include the mobile web activities in this investigation since FxOS 
application were designed based on web application. Therefore, this research was attempting to 
proof that the investigation result of web-centric OS are totally different with other mobile OS 
investigation.  
 
3. Experiment Setup 
 
The research experiment was divided into five stages; (1) Preparing the host machine for 
acquisition process and analysis work; (2) Acquisition of phone image and memory image; (3) 
Installing the phone with targeted application; (4) Executed the activities and documenting all 
steps taken; and (5) Comparing base image with activities images 
 
3.1 Preparing the Host Machine for Acquisition Process and Analysis Work 
 
The evidences were acquired using Ubuntu 14.04 LTS and then analyzed in Windows 8.1 
machine. The need to use separated operating system is due to the fact that memory acquisition 
will only work on Linux environment; whereas most of the analysis tools were design under 
Windows operating system. To successfully capture the phone image using Ubuntu, the host 
machine need to be running under Android Debug Bridge (ADB) (Yusoff et al., 2014a, 2014b, 
2014c, 2014d). Following command was used to configure ADB package in Ubuntu: 
 
# sudo apt-get install android-tools-adb 
 
As for the volatile memory acquisition, we configure Linux Memory Extractor (LiME) 
(Sylve et al., 2012) using the following command: 
 
# sudo apt-get install lime-forensics-dkms 
 
AccessData Forensic Toolkit (FTK) version 3.1.2 (Accessdata, 2007) and HxD Hex 
Editor 1.7.7.0 (Maël Hörz, 2009) were installed in Windows machine to analyze captured 
forensic images and QtADB 0.81 Android Manager (QtADB, 2011) was used to browse the 
system files in the Geeksphone Peak. 
 
3.2 Acquisition of Phone Image and Memory Image 
 
Two types of binary images were extracted, meant to be used as forensic evidence in our 
case studies. The first binary image were extracted from FxOS phone internal memory using dd 
command. FxOS phone was first connected to the host machine and then ADB connection was 
 started before we proceed to execute dd command. We have used the following command to start 
ADB connection between the phone and the host machine. 
 
# adb shell 
 
Once the connection is established, we have performed the following dd command to 
copy bit-by-bit of phone internal memory into SD card and we named it as FxOS phone memory 
(.ffp): 
 
# dd if=/dev/block/mmcblk0 of=/mnt/emmc/base.ffp bs=2048 
 
The whole binary image of FxOS internal memory was then copied from SD card into the 
host machine and we named it as base.ffp. We used block size 2MB during dd command 
execution as per suggested in previous studies (Yusoff et al., 2014b).  
 
The next step was the extraction of the second binary image from FxOS phone volatile 
memory using LiME. LiME were design as such to allow the acquisition of volatile memory 
from Linux-based devices and originally tested using Android phones (Sylve et al., 2012). ADB 
was then used to load LiME, and the way of volatile memory acquisition at this step is similar to 
the dd command. We used the following command in ADB to load LiME from phone SD card: 
 
# adb push lime.ko /mnt/emmc/lime.ko 
 
After LiME were loaded, we run insmod to copy live bit-by-bit of volatile memory into 
SD card. For volatile memory, we named it as FxOS memory (.ffm) 
 
# insmod /mnt/emmc/lime.ko "path=/mnt/emmc/base.ffm format=lime" 
 
Both internal phone images (.ffp) and memory images (.ffm) were directed to SD card. 
After the acquisition process has completed, we killed the ADB connection, and then mounted 
the SD card to copy both images. We set the same name for both images and only the extension 
and file size are left as the differences. The steps were repeated for every action in our 
experiment.  
 
3.3 Installing the Phone with Targeted Application 
 
The objective of this experiment is to investigate both social media network and instant 
messaging platform in FxOS. Due to the limited number of applications offered in Mozilla 
Market Place, we have only managed to investigate 5 applications and 4 mobile webs as shows 
in Table 3 
 
Table 3 - Selected Applications and Mobile Web 
 
Group Application Mobile Web 
Social Media  1. Facebook 
2. Twitter 
1. Facebook 
2. Twitter 
3. Google+ 
 Instant Messaging 1. Telegram 
2. OpenWapp 
3. Line 
1. Telegram 
 
The investigation were performed on both application and the mobile web. The purpose 
of investigating both applications and mobile web, were to list out the differences and 
similarities between FxOS applications with its mobile web. 
 
3.4 Executed the Activities and Documenting All Steps Taken 
 
Our investigation in this experiment has started the moment we installed the applications 
in to the phone. We have also created a few dummy accounts for the experiments. All detail 
steps, credentials and communication activities were properly documented. In order to facilitate 
the use of credential during our experiment, we created all social media account using the same 
HPDLO DGGUHVV DQG SDVVZRUG ZKLFK DUH ³PRKGQDMZDGL#JPDLOFRP´ DQG ³QDMZDGL´
respectively. In general, all social media and instant messaging application will have one extra 
step; which is installation of the application. In contrary for mobile web, we can just browse 
directly from the site. Table 4 shows all steps and activities taken for social media experiment 
 
Table 4 - Detail Steps for Social Media Experiment 
Social Media Steps and Action Image Filename 
Facebook 
Application 
Installing Facebook Application Facebook-Install 
Login Facebook Account (ID : Root Wadi) 
- Email : mohd.najwadi@gmail.com 
- Password : najwadi87 
Facebook-Login 
Facebook Activities 
- Post Status : Posting with love 
- PM Mohd Najwadi : Hi. Test send msg 
- Received Reply : received with thanks 
Facebook-Post 
Facebook Web Login Facebook thru web www.facebook.com 
- Email - mohd.najwadi@gmail.com 
- Password - najwadi87 
Facebook-Browse 
Facebook Activities 
- Post : Posting from web 
- PM Mohd Najwadi : Test again 
- Received Reply : received second time 
Facebook-xtvt 
 
Twitter 
Application 
Installing Twitter Application Twitter-Install 
Login Twitter Account (ID : @wadieq) 
- Email : mohd.najwadi@gmail.com 
- Password : najwadi87 
Twitter-Login 
Twitter Activities 
- Tweet : My first tweet 
- Mention : @wadieq test mention 
- Favourites : @wadieq Taman tepi rumah  
Twitter-Tweet 
Twitter Web Login Twitter thru web www.twitter.com 
- Email : mohd.najwadi@gmail.com 
- Password : najwadi87 
Twitter-Browse 
Twitter Activities 
- Tweet : My second tweet 
- Reply : @wadieq Reply comment 
- Unfollow @MunirRashid 
Twitter-xtvt 
 
Google+ Web Login Google+ thru web plus.google.com Google-Login 
 - Email : mohd.najwadi@gmail.com 
- Password : najwadi87 
Google+ Activties 
- Follow people : tomska, british motogp 
- create circle : firefox plus 
- post : google plus firefox 
- comment : komen sendiri 
Google-xtvt 
 
There were 12 time acquisition processes were performed for each internal phone image 
and memory image altogether; and the files were name according to the steps taken as shown in 
Table 4. We have also tested with Facebook and Twitter, both on applications and mobile web, 
while for Google+ we can only test it on web since there is no application supported for Google+ 
in Mozilla Market Place at the moment we conducted the experiment. The phones were restored 
back to their factory setting only after we want to start with new application or mobile web 
experiments. For social media investigation, we restored the phones 5 times, the number of 
experiment conducted. After the completion of the social media investigation, we then proceeded 
with instant messaging step. Instant messaging accounts were tied to different mobile numbers. 
In this experiment, we registered instant messaging account using mobile number 
³´DQGZHSHUIRUPHGWKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWKPRELOHQXPEHU³´
Table 5 shows all the steps and activities taken for instant messaging experiment 
Table 5 - Detail Steps for Instant Messaging Experiment 
Instant 
Messaging 
Steps and Action Image Filename 
Telegram 
Application 
Installing Telegram Applications Telegram-Install 
Register Telegram account 
- select Malaysia +60162444415 
- generating telegram code : 99246  
- received sms from +93450009276 
Telegram-Register 
Telegram Activities 
- Sent to +60125999159 : Hi 
- Received from +60125999159 : Hello 
- Received from +60125999159 : InstaSize_2015_4_36453.jpg 
- Save picture - asking for access picture > 
- Received from +60125999159 : 200507000.pdf 
- Save file : asking for access memory card > 
Telegram-chat 
 
Telegram Web Login Telegram thru web web.telegram.org 
- select Malaysia +60162444415 
- generating telegram code 34303  
- received sms from +93450009276 
Telegram-Browse 
Telegram Activities 
- Sent to +60125999159 : Hi from web 
- Received from +60125999159 : Hi back 
- Received from +60125999159 : IMG_20150508_200905.jpg 
- Save picture : failed 
- Sent to +60125999159 : Thanks for the picture 
Telegram-webxtvt 
OpenWapp Installing OpenWapp Application  OpenWapp-install 
Register WhatsApp 
- select Malaysia +60162444415 
- generating WhatsApp code 560-103 
- received sms from 63365 
OpenWapp-reg 
 
OpenWapp Activties 
- Received from +60125999159 : Hello 
OpenWapp-chat 
 
 - Sent to +60125999159 : Testing openwapp from Firefox phone 
- Received from +60125999159 : IMG_20150508_171904.jpg 
- Save picture : 
agxahpqv0gm3suwkv7glgnxz6ig4k_bh6jq_bivja5q0.jpg 
Line 
Application 
Installing Line Application Line-Install 
Register Line Account 
- select Malaysia +60162444415 
- Reg code 1877 
- Received sms from +601117224258 
Line-Reg 
 
Line Activities 
- najwadi added syamsaziela as friend 
- najwadi sent msg : Hi syamsaziela (6.15PM) 
- syamsaziela replied : send to firefox phone (6.15PM) 
- syamsaziela sent : IMG_8933.jpg 
- najwadi received, saved (read 6.18PM) : New folder name LINE - 
2015412_185355518.jpg 
Line-xtvt 
 
In instant messaging experiment, we have performed the acquisition processes 11 times 
for each internal phone image and memory image. The files were also named according to the 
step taken as shown in Table 5. The experiment were performed using OpenWapp and Line 
applications, and both Telegram application and mobile web. OpenWapp is the third party 
application for WhatsApp in FxOS because WhatsApp was not officially offered in Mozilla 
Market Place. Both WhatsApp and Line does not offer mobile web support. During our 
investigation, we restored the phone to their factory setting 4 times, the number of experiment 
conducted.  
 
3.5 Comparing Base Image with Activities Images 
 
Acquired forensic images were analyzed using AccessData Forensic Toolkit (FTK) 
version 3.1.2 and HxD Hex Editor 1.7.7.0. Our major analysis technique were solely rely on the 
actions and execution to the phone during experiment. The base image were then compared with 
the captured forensic images according to the detail steps and actions taken. MD5 hash value of 
all images were recorded as shows in Table 6.  
 
Table 6 - MD5 Hash Value for Acquired Images 
  
Filename Phone Image (.ffp) Memory Image (.ffm) 
Base F080B51EDBCCA1DFB85023A96C86B95D 7D93024506D837EB85682AC6C2DAE7A9 
Facebook-Install 94A4CCEB5333D5A8D7E8498E531DFCF7 24E0273A4CB7C852E20230E823675A50 
Facebook-Login 755811F684ED0A987E07C2B27D047560 DA9A48B9F04F73415BE37E26F23B4612 
Facebook-Post 51ABC84775AEA4326814707450D21D23 84EDE34F2059CE45CE55C195E6B4F116 
Facebook-Browse FCB0C5CFEEDC292185B340C809B63391 A040D89CBFBBD3F8A908F2E9F9ED4C3E 
Facebook-xtvt 486719D871E0B71D198099E82C13D959 3C3F778E0FA59A93B4274265E4515967 
Twitter-Install BF63A51A105A6DDA94FC6A55D511FD76 E3178BA282723C70DBBB65DE9CBA2FFB 
Twitter-Login 6B7F1035F1B2C4DECA3B793F3AF36CF5 987C447CC2B7651D283B53021121E93F 
Twitter-Tweet 6A18EDCAD1A2AF26CA274067D1F27B34 516FB1B243A47AB1256B121321BF98E6 
Twitter-Browse 57F6990C23DF171C32EF8BF81FF550A3 242247A35D866D8E9F642D171457EC52 
Twitter-xtvt 4CE51367D17FD6FDE29EAC744E763A3B 872975E4C17319CCD44E0AF7E968CF33 
Google-Login C5B877501D82C2CA6998219FF3767FFD E94A7D2141E3CF18A146AAA8BCB6D181 
Google-xtvt 5BCBBD245F29662C7127B20B8341952B CDD22BA569641831292E85C9C8F860E1 
Telegram-Install B15D74872C6E42244F859A73AD24C25B 079F5A0CBEDB4DD920B90A8CA26E3FCB 
Telegram-Register A46445F6DB4A79C6FFD354CED983DF0A A43650BD2947C1CEF6AB1117C7F4070F 
 Telegram-chat 2424B5DE62DBE83F6BB8DAD19753A84D 55F5E5BD6B575113F3600F3A381F0D16 
Telegram-Browse B3DE5669770CEAAF61F602499513328D 3EB424F3D1D575F3E7A86A31948A83AB 
Telegram-webxtvt F261B40B276A572C93C3D34AD9738444 A0E12223ADD6BC1C7845B12527B1581C 
OpenWapp-install 1BD68D8D6BD787AC41AC67E9CD1726AC B4F80CF7E711D4FBD595673DB3DE84CB 
OpenWapp-reg EFE5DB509CEFFA005F4A60337AA3CF2F BD6F684E93D53DE79E616088165A306E 
OpenWapp-chat 56590158061E662FCAED3BC1A5C773ED 517D345BE8FBAD1FFFF45ED5CA7345F5 
Line-Install C5E85B3BA980E8DA7130DBB9556C6501 29908DE05F3B7DECEA3B17ADF1EDD946 
Line-Reg 992818E14DD9684715EACB812CBB6FED EF641273ABF57E76F4516803DEDE8216 
Line-xtvt D13BF7662CB491E73DB6ABF7E193F401 56C0CBE3B8DD306EBFFEDA68EEBDF5C3 
 
MD5 hash value were taken and preserved. Any modification of forensic images will be 
easily detected by looking at their hash value. In our experiment, none of these forensic images 
shared the same hash values. This conclude that our forensic images was giving differences in 
value, modification and evidence in it. 
 
4. Discussion and Analysis 
 
In this section, we have divided our analysis into two parts. The first analysis has focused 
on social media investigation, while the second part has focused on instant messaging 
investigation. For both analysis, we started with the internal phone images (.ffp) and then 
proceeded with memory images (.ffm). The purpose of separating the two analysis was to 
differentiate between both analysis results. By doing this analysis separately, we have discovered 
that certain information which was not recoverable in the phone images, was able to be retrieved 
from memory images.  
 
 
4.1 Social Media Investigation 
 
In social media experiment, we were focusing the investigation for 2 social media 
applications and 3 social media mobile web. We have successfully separating the captured 
images based on major steps and details as shown in Table 3. There were several forensic worth 
of evidence that we were trying to recover and trace. First, we have explored the residual 
artifacts generated by application and URL involved for mobile web. Second, we were trying 
find any ID name that able to be captured after we login into social media. Third, we have 
searched for any credential involving username and password after login process. Forth, we have 
traced back what activities that has been captured in the images. Lastly we have checked for the 
data remnant and left over after complete uninstallation of the application. 
 
4.1.1 Social Media Phone Image 
 
Each of the phone images were opened using AccessData Forensic Toolkit (FTK) version 
3.1.2 and HxD Hex Editor 1.7.7.0. The analysis were conducted manually by searching several 
keyword related to previous experiment in forensically sounds manner. The first binary search 
performed was the application keyword. This search executed once the selected application 
successfully installed from Mozilla Market Place. Since our factory setting base image was only 
comes with preinstalled application and none of it were used in our investigation, we cannot find 
 any keyword of selected social media from the base image. Figure 2 shows Twitter keyword 
appear when we executed the first search. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 - Application Keyword Found After Installation in Phone Image 
 
The second search were performed to find URL for social media mobile web. Mobile 
web is totally different with application. We do not had to install it but only need to browse using 
preinstalled Firefox browser. Figure 3 shows Twitter URL was found in the images and the result 
has also showing the visited date and time. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 - URL for Social Media Mobile Web Found in Phone Image 
 
The third search were to find our profile name or user ID once we logged into the social 
media. Profile name is different with username. Username used to login into the social media 
 while profile name were the name displayed in our social media account. Figure 4 shows our 
profile name together with the user ID and Facebook profile path that we managed to find. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Facebook Profile Name Appear in Phone Image. 
 
One of the most valuable information that we need to protect in social media, were the 
account credentials. In the event that the account credentials fall into wrong hands, they can 
definitely log in into our account and pretended to be us. When they commit any crime using our 
account, prosecution will be charged under our name. Next search were to find username and 
password that we used during our login process. Username rules were different between social 
media. Facebook and Google+ only accept email as username, while twitter can accept either 
email or selected string. Figure 5 shows Twitter username appear in our search. 
 
 
 
Figure 5 - Username in Twitter Phone Image 
 
 Activities and communication in social media have contributed a massive valuable 
information in forensic investigation. From the communication pattern, we might be able to 
identify if there is any cyber bullying as well as cyber stalking. We also can also investigate if 
any sexual harassment had occurred. In the next search, we were trying to find activities that can 
be recovered in our experiment. We purposely used a certain communication string in Malaysian 
ODQJXDJHVR WKDW WKHVHDUFKZLOOQRW UHGXQGDQWZLWKFRPPRQZRUG OLNH³KHOOR´DQG³KL´ LQ WKH
images. Figure 6 below shows the communication string that we use earlier in Twitter 
experiment, appearing in the search result. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 - Communication String That Able to Recover from Phone Image 
 
The search process were executed by using prepared detail steps with the phone images 
accordingly. If the information were able to be found and recovered, we marked it as right. After 
all search has been executed and completed, the findings were recorded as shows in Table 7 
 
Table 7 - Social Media Phone Image Finding Summary 
 
Evidences Facebook 
Application 
Facebook 
Web 
Twitter 
Application 
Twitter 
Web 
Google+ 
Web 
Application keyword ᅚ N/A ᅚ N/A N/A 
Web URL N/A ᅚ N/A ᅚ ᅚ 
Name after login ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅟ 
Username after login ᅟ ᅟ ᅚ ᅚ ᅟ 
Password after login ᅟ ᅟ ᅟ ᅟ ᅟ 
Activities ᅟ ᅟ ᅚ ᅚ ᅟ 
Uninstalled data remnant ᅚ N/A ᅚ N/A N/A 
 
In general, all application keyword will appear in the search once we successfully 
installed the application. These result show that, there were changes in application list once it 
was installed. The same search result happened to web URL keyword. Once we visited the web, 
 the keyword will be stored in the browsing history, including date and time stamp. When we 
login into the selected social media, all profile names were recorded in the phone except 
Google+ mobile web. As for social media username, only Twitter application and Twitter mobile 
web were able for retrieval. No password can be seen for all social media. By the same token, the 
communications and activities only appear in Twitter application and Twitter mobile web. No 
activities can be seen in Facebook and Google+. Data remnant were able to be retrieved from 
both Facebook and Twitter application.  
 
4.1.2 Social Media Phone and Memory Images 
 
Analysis of the memory images were the same with the previous analysis. We have also 
performed the keyword search by using a prepared detail steps. The search were repeated, but 
confined to only for the value that does not appear in our first search using phone images. Each 
of the memory images were also opened using AccessData FTK and HxD Hex Editor. For this 
analysis, we focused more on social media credential and communication activities, since most 
of this part were not recovered from the phone images analysis. Figure 7 shows Facebook 
credential that we used to login appearing in our first search attempt. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 - Facebook Credential Found Without Encrypted in Memory Image 
 
The search was continued with other social media credential and communication 
activities. The summary in Table 8 show the result of what evidences can be retrieved from both 
phone images and memory images. 
 
Table 8 - Social Media Phone Images and Memory Images Finding Summary 
 
Evidences Facebook 
Application 
Facebook 
Web 
Twitter 
Application 
Twitter 
Web 
Google+ 
Web 
Keyword after install ᅚ N/A ᅚ N/A N/A 
Web URL N/A ᅚ N/A ᅚ ᅚ 
 Name after login ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ 
Username after login ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅟ 
Password after login ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅟ 
Activities ᅟ ᅟ ᅚ ᅚ ᅟ 
Uninstalled data remnant ᅚ N/A ᅚ N/A N/A 
 
The finding of this analysis has shown that, all credentials especially password cannot be 
seen in phone images, but we were able to retrieve it in memory images except for the Google+. 
As for the communication activities, we still do not find any keyword matching in Facebook and 
Google+. We then randomly checked with Facebook and Google+ memory images to find any 
communication occurrence other than what we recorded, but failed to find any. The result of the 
study was suggesting that the communication activities in Facebook and Google+ for FxOS were 
either encrypted or stored in their respective server only.   
 
 
4.2 Instant Messaging Investigation 
 
For instant messaging experiment and investigations, we have managed to acquire 3 
instant messaging applications and 1 instant messaging mobile web activities. First, we have 
explored the residual artifacts generated by application and URL involved for mobile web. 
Second, we have tried to find the user phone number used during registration. Third, we have 
tried to get the registration code and SMS or call verification received. Forth, we have traced 
back what activities that has been captured in the images. Lastly, we have checked for data 
remnant after we complete the uninstallation the application. 
 
4.2.1 Instant Messaging Phone Image 
 
Like the previous experiment, each of the phone images were opened using AccessData 
Forensic Toolkit (FTK) version 3.1.2 and HxD Hex Editor 1.7.7.0. The analysis has also 
conducted by manually searching several keyword related to previous experiment in forensically 
sounds manner. The first binary search performed was the application keyword. This search 
executed once the selected application successfully installed from Mozilla Market Place. Since 
our factory setting base image was only comes with preinstalled application and none of it were 
used in our investigation, we cannot find any keyword of selected instant messaging from the 
base image. Figure 8 shows Telegram keyword appear when we executed the first search. 
 
  
 
Figure 8 - Application keyword Found After Installation in Phone Memory 
 
The second search were executed to find URL for instant messaging mobile web, in this 
experiment only Telegram we tested for mobile web. Mobile web is totally different with the 
application. We do not had to install, instead we only need to browse using preinstalled Firefox 
browser. Figure 9 shows Telegram URL was found in the images and the result was also 
showing the visited date and time. 
 
 
 
Figure 9 - URL for Instant Messaging Mobile Web Found in Phone Image 
 
The third search were to find the phone number used during registration. Most of our 
selected instant messaging services asked the phone number to be tied with account registration. 
Instant messaging services like Telegram and WhatsApp will display the phone number together 
with selected name when we send private message to other user, while Line will not display any 
number but only selected name. The confirmation during registration were either code from SMS 
 or received call from the providers. Figure 10 and Figure 11 shows the phone number and 
registration code for WhatsApp services respectively. 
 
 
 
Figure 10 - Phone Number Used During Registration Found in Phone Memory 
 
 
 
Figure 11 - Registration Code Received During Account Confirmation Found in Phone Memory 
 
The search process were executed by using a prepared detail steps with the phone images 
accordingly. If the information were able to be found and recovered, we marked it as right. After 
all search has been executed and completed, the findings were recorded as shows in Table 9 
 
Table 9 - Instant Messaging Phone Image Finding Summary 
 
Evidences Telegram 
Application 
Telegram Web OpenWapp 
Application 
Line 
Application 
 Keyword after install ᅚ N/A ᅚ ᅚ 
Web URL N/A ᅚ N/A N/A 
Number after register ᅟ ᅟ ᅚ ᅟ 
Registration code ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ 
SMS/Call verification ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ 
Activities ᅟ ᅟ ᅟ ᅟ 
Uninstalled data remnant ᅚ N/A ᅚ ᅚ 
 
In general, all application keyword will appear in the search once we have successfully 
installed the application. These result shows that, there were changes in application list once it 
was installed. The same search result happened to web URL keyword. Once we visited the web, 
the keyword were stored in the browsing history, including date and time stamp. We try to find 
the phone number we were used during registration but we only manage to find it in OpenWapp 
phone images. However, all registration code, SMS as well as call verification were manage to 
find in all instant messaging phone images. In contrary, no communication activities were 
manage to trace in this analysis. Data remnant were able to be retrieved from both Facebook and 
Twitter application.  
 
4.2.2 Instant Messaging Phone and Memory Images 
 
Analysis of the memory images were the same with the previous analysis. We have also 
performed the keyword search using a prepared detail steps. The search were repeated, but 
confined to only for the value that does not appear in our first search using phone images. Each 
of the memory images were also opened using AccessData Forensic Toolkit (FTK) version 3.1.2 
and HxD Hex Editor 1.7.7.0. For this analysis, we focused more on registration number and 
instant messaging communication activities, since most of this part were not recovered from the 
phone images analysis. Figure 12 shows OpenWapp communication string that we used during 
this experiment. 
 
 
Figure 12 - OpenWapp Communication String Found in Memory Image 
 
 The search were continued with other instant messaging communication activities and the 
phone number used in Telegram and Line. The summary in Table 9 shows the result of what 
evidences can be retrieved from both phone images and memory images. 
 
Table 9 - Instant Messaging Phone Images and Memory Images Finding Summary 
Evidences Telegram 
Application 
Telegram Web OpenWapp 
Application 
Line 
Application 
Keyword after install ᅚ N/A ᅚ ᅚ 
Web URL N/A ᅚ N/A N/A 
Number after register ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ 
Registration code ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ 
SMS/Call verification ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ ᅚ 
Activities ᅟ ᅟ ᅚ ᅟ 
Uninstalled data remnant ᅚ N/A ᅚ ᅚ 
 
The finding of this analysis has shown that, all registration phone numbers that were not 
able to be seen in phone images, were able to be traced in memory images. As for the 
communication activities, we have only manage to find the communication string in OpenWapp 
and still do not find any keyword matching in Telegram and Line. We then randomly checked 
with Telegram and Line memory images to find any communication occurrence other than what 
we recorded, but also failed to find any. The result of the studies suggested that the 
communication activities in Telegram and Line for FxOS were either encrypted or stored in their 
respective server only.   
 
6. Conclusion  
 
In this research, we have successfully acquired 24 forensic images, each from FxOS 
internal phone and volatile memory. The acquired images were then extracted based on the 
action performed as per documented in detail steps, and were named accordingly. These images 
were then analyzed and the result was presented and tabled. The result of this research has 
indicated that most of valuable forensic information were residing in volatile memory. The 
finding of this study also suggested that memory in FxOS phone were not encrypted, hence it 
was readable with our forensic tools. Therefore, we managed to recover and trace social media 
account credential especially on Facebook and Twitter services. In contrary, all untraced 
information in phone images such as profile name on Google+ and phone number used during 
registration for Telegram and Line, were traceable in memory images.  
 
 The other conclusion drawn from this research were, FxOS applications behaving the 
same way of its counterpart in mobile web. Therefore, we managed to get the exact same 
forensic traces and evidences when we analyzed the same services, both in application and 
mobile web platform. For example Facebook, Twitter and Telegram applications are producing 
the same forensic trace with its mobile web. In short, these findings have significantly enhanced 
our understanding of the similarity of FxOS application which design based on WebAPI, with its 
mobile web platforms. By using WebAPI, FxOS application can executed under very minimal 
memory requirement, just like opening the web browser.  
  
 On the other hand, the analysis of the acquired images has shown that application 
artifacts were remained in FxOS device after it has been uninstalled. The data remnant and left 
over from the application folders and browser history will be value added to the investigation 
and many more information have been successfully retrieved. Further, the findings from this 
research have also make several contributions to the current set of mobile forensic investigation 
standard. It is recommend that further research to be undertaken with more broad application and 
mobile web platform. More forensic investigation of FxOS application would help us to establish 
greater degree of accuracy in this study.  
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